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AN ARGUMENT ON THE RECORD FOR MORE
FEDERAL JUDGESHIPS*
William M. Richman**
The federal circuit courts have changed radically in the last
twenty-five years in response to an overwhelming increase in
caseload. For most of their one-hundred-year history, the judges
heard oral arguments and, sometimes with the help of a single
clerk, wrote fully reasoned, published opinions in nearly all
cases.
I.

SHORTCUTS TO DECISION MAKING

Today, those time-honored procedures are sadly truncated.
Now, fewer than half the circuit courts hear oral argument in at
least half of the cases they decide. Traditionally the norm, a
fully reasoned precedential opinion today accounts for less than
a third of all case terminations. Further, the judge now operates
not as an isolated artisan, but rather as the manager of a team of
clerks and staff attorneys. Their role is to conserve judicial effort
by screening cases and participating significantly in the opinionwriting and decision-making processes. Law clerks have trebled
in the last thirty years; and central staff, unknown thirty years
ago, now outnumber judges in most circuits.
Not only is "judge time" rationed, the key decisions
allocating the judges' efforts are not even made by the judges.
Clerks and central staff screen the appeals to determine how
* Testimony given on April 3, 1998, before the Commission on Structural Alternatives for
the Federal Courts. Professor Richman's views appear more fully at William M. Richman,
The Appeals Process, 24 PEPP. L. REV. 911 (1997); William L. Reynolds & William M.
Richman, Studying Deck Chairs on the Titanic, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1290 (1996); and
William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and the New
Certiorari:Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 273 (1996).
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much judge time to allocate to each case and to recommend
whether oral argument should be granted and whether a full
opinion (or, indeed, any opinion) should be written. Thus, an
effective right to appeal error to the circuit courts no longer
exists; instead, litigants must petition the staff to obtain access to
the judges. In short, despite their statutory and historical role as
courts of appeals, the circuit courts have become certiorari
courts.
II. THE CUMULATIVE IMPACT OF THE SHORTCUTS

These developments have had other unfortunate
consequences. First, the overall quality of the work of the circuit
courts has declined markedly. The reduction is most obvious in
the opinions: more than half are unpublished, and a substantial
portion fails the most minimal standards. Second, reductions in
oral argument deprive litigants of the assurance that the judges
have paid some personal attention to their cases. The
proliferation of para-judicial personnel only exacerbates the
problem, leading litigants to suspect that the staff, not the
judges, have made the decision.
Third, and perhaps most important, the transformation has
created different tracks of justice for different cases and
different litigants. An "important" case, such as a major
securities matter, receives the traditional model of appellate
justice. In a "routine" case (an appeal of a denial of social
security benefits, for example), central staff may read the briefs,
recommend against oral argument, and prepare a draft opinion.
In these cases, actual judge time probably consists of limited
review of the staff recommendations. The draft opinion is not
published, and sometimes no opinion (other than a brief
affirmance) is issued at all.
The problem of two-track justice is exacerbated because the
burdens of the change fall disproportionately on the poorest and
least powerful federal litigants involved in the routine, or
"trivial," cases: social security litigation, civil rights cases, pro
se appeals, and prisoner petitions. The standard explanation that
some cases are more "important" than others because of high
economic stakes or more complex legal problems misses the
point. The basic guarantee of justice to all in equal measure

AN ARGUMENT ON THE RECORD FOR MORE FEDERAL JUDGESHIPS

39

suffers under any regime that allocates justice differently
according to the wealth and sophistication of the litigants.
These developments are a direct consequence of an
increase in caseload that has far out-stripped the increase in the
number of judges. Yet the transformation was not inevitable.
Relying on a series of logically flawed and empirically baseless
arguments, the Judicial Establishment has steadfastly resisted
the one obvious solution: to ask Congress for a radical increase
in the number of judges. The real motive for resistance to the
needed expansion has been the desire to maintain a small, elite
federal judiciary. The size of the tool has dictated the size of the
job, rather than the other way around.
III. ANSWERING THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST
INCREASING JUDGESHIPS

A. Quality Candidates
The argument that increasing the number of judgeships
would vastly reduce the quality of the bench is hard to take
seriously. Increasing circuit judgeships by 100 would result in a
3,000-to-one ratio of lawyers to circuit judgeships. Surely one
out of every 3,000 lawyers in this country is qualified, willing,
and able to fill a circuit judgeship. There are over 600 district
judges, about 800 state appellate judges, over 5,000 law
professors, and countless senior partners, prosecutors, public
defenders, and state and federal administrative lawyers. Surely
that group could produce 100 distinguished candidates for the
circuit courts.
A variation of the argument asserts that increases in
judgeships will reduce the prestige of the position and thus
diminish the pool of distinguished candidates. No empirical
evidence supports the bald assertion, and the limited evidence
available suggests the opposite. Circuit judgeships have not
become less sought after as their number has tripled since 1950,
nor is there a dearth of fine applicants for the 649 district court
judgeships.
Another variation asserts that an increase in judgeships will
reduce the scrutiny of each appointment, permitting the political
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process to forward and confirm mediocre candidates. With
respect to congressional scrutiny, the argument comes too late.
Judges are confirmed in groups, and hearings are pro forma.
There is no empirical support for the argument that increases in
judgeships will reduce other forms of scrutiny; and the limited
evidence suggests otherwise. There has been no noticeable
reduction in scrutiny or quality as the circuit bench has tripled in
the last fifty years, nor do we know of variations in scrutiny and
quality between the First Circuit, with six judges, and the Ninth,
with twenty-eight. Further, if increases would dilute quality and
scrutiny, there is no indication of the relevant numbers or
proportions. For all we know, a 1000% increase in judgeships
might have a substantial impact on scrutiny and quality, while
an increase of 100% (the largest suggested so far) might have
none.
The quality-of-the-bench argument suffers from an even
more serious flaw. It focuses on the quality of the active circuit
judges-not on the quality of the appellate justice dispensed. A
substantial increase in the number of judgeships would reduce
improper delegation to staff and thus increase the odds that
every case on the docket would receive the personal attention of
the judges. Thus even if expansion reduced the quality of the
average circuit judge, it would still increase the overall quality
of appellate justice.
B. Expansion is Too Expensive
The 100 new judgeships now needed would require an
annual expenditure of about $80 million, not a trivial sum. But
large numbers can be understood only through comparisons. The
federal government spends only two-tenths of one percent of the
federal budget on the entire federal judiciary-$2.6 billion out
of the total of $1.4 trillion. The $80 million required for 100 new
judgeships in turn amounts to less than 3% of the $2.6 billion
dollar judiciary budget, and thus about one two-hundredth of
one percent of the federal budget.
By comparison the franking privilege for members of
Congress costs about $60 million per year; the National Gallery
of Art, about $50 million; price support payments to wool and
mohair producers, about $180 million; and more than forty
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universities receive over $70 million each in Federal Research

and Development Funds.
The argument suffers from a more crucial flaw. Even if the
extra capacity were too expensive on some platonic scale, that is
a reason for Congress to refuse to create the judgeships. It is not
a reason for the judiciary to refuse to ask for them.
C. Too Much Precedent?
Opponents of increased appellate capacity have argued that
expansion will lead to instability in the law. According to this
argument, if Congress adds judgeships to existing circuits, the
circuit courts will decide more cases, and the law of the circuit
will become muddled, which in turn, will promote higher rates
of appeal as losing litigants find it increasingly worthwhile to
"take their chances." Alternatively, Congress could add more
circuits, but anti-expansionists contend that doing so would
increase inter-circuit conflicts, which already are too numerous
for the Supreme Court to resolve.
1.

No Empirical Evidence

The first of many problems with the instability-of-the-law
argument is that its crucial premises lack any empirical support.
There simply is no evidence that increasing the number of
judgeships within a circuit reduces the stability of circuit law or
increases the rate of appeal. Nor is there any evidence that
increasing the number of circuits will create a serious problem
of unresolved inter-circuit conflicts.
A Federal Judicial Center study reported that 80% of
responding circuit judges and 68% of responding district judges
believed that lack of clear circuit precedent was a small or nonexistent problem.' Further, in each group the percentage of
judges expressing concern did not correlate with circuit size.
Another useful study, commissioned by the Ninth Circuit and
conducted by Professor Arthur D. Hellman, targeted
inconsistency of circuit precedent and unpredictability of
1. JUDITH A. MCKENNA,

STRUCTURAL

FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS 93 (1993).

2. Id.

AND OTHER ALTERNATIVES

FOR THE
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decisions.' Hellman examined a sample of the published
opinions of the Ninth Circuit and found little evidence of intracircuit conflict.4 Further, Professor Hellman concluded that the
issues that did cause unpredictability would do so regardless of
the number of applicable precedents and, therefore, regardless of
circuit size.
Hellman also examined separate dissenting and concurring
opinions on 172 issues in the sample. His analysis led him to
conclude that the primary cause of unpredictable outcomes in
the Ninth Circuit was not "a plethora of circuit precedents that
point in different directions," but rather the "absence of a circuit
precedent that is closely on point, or less commonly, a factspecific rule... that by its nature requires case-by-case
evaluation." 6 These conditions, he concluded, would "occur less
often in the large circuit because the larger number of decisions
increases the odds that there will be a precedent on point." 7
A variation on the unstable law argument asserts that
increasing the number of circuit judges would create instability
in the law of the circuit and that this instability in turn would
increase the rate of appeal. Proponents of this argument cite the
five-fold increase in national appeal rates that has accompanied
the steady growth in appellate judgeships. This argument is a
classic example of a logical fallacy, post hoc ergo propter hoc.
Absent some clear causal mechanism, it makes no sense to
attribute accelerated appeal rates to additional judgeships, rather
than to a host of other changes in the social and legal landscape.
Not every correlation is a cause.
More enlightening is a comparison of current appeal rates
in circuits of various sizes. If the more-judges-creates-moreappeals argument is valid, we should expect to see a relationship
between circuit size and appeal rates. In fact, however, rates of
appeal seem to be unrelated to circuit size, suggesting that
increasing the size of the circuit bench is unlikely to affect those
rates.
3. Arthur D. Hellman, Breaking the Banc: The Common-Law Process in the Large
Appellate Court, 23 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 915 (1991).
4. Id. at 920.
5. Id. at 983-84.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 984.
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In lieu of enlarging the existing circuits, Congress could
create more appellate capacity by creating new circuits.
Opponents of this solution see it merely as a trade of one kind of
inconsistency for another, contending that inter-circuit conflicts
will multiply far beyond the Supreme Court's already
inadequate capacity to resolve them. Once again, the empirical
evidence suggests otherwise. In a study commissioned by the
Federal Judicial Center pursuant to congressional request,
Professor Hellman investigated 142 inter-circuit conflicts that
the Supreme Court refused to hear in the 1984 and 1985 Terms.!
Of these he found only forty that (a) had not been put to rest by
subsequent decisions or legislation, (b) continued to generate
litigation, and (c) controlled outcomes in reported cases.9
Further, he noted that the Court had ample room on its docket to
resolve these conflicts.'
2.

Consistency v. Capacity

Even if we assume that new judgeships will produce
significant inconsistency, it still does not follow that Congress
should refuse to create them. The logical leap from newjudgeships-increase-inconsistency to create-no-new-judgeships
is vulnerable to a powerful reductio ad absurdum attack. If
consistency is the paramount goal of the judicial process, and
fewer judgeships mean more consistency, Congress should
reduce the number of authorized judgeships, yet the
consequences of such a maneuver would be disastrous. Today
the circuit courts can keep current by giving full appellate
process to only half their caseload and handling the other 50%
bureaucratically. If Congress reduced the number of judgeships,
even fewer cases would receive the traditional appellate process,
and correspondingly more would be handled bureaucratically.
To push the absurdity even farther, if fewer judgeships mean
greater consistency, why not have a single three-judge panel for
the nation?

8. ARTHUR D. HELLMAN, UNRESOLVED INTERCIRCUIT CONFLICTS: THE NATURE
AND SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM iii (1994).

9. Id. at 120.
10. Id. at 121.
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The answer, of course, is that consistency is not the only
goal. At least as important is adequate capacity. Thus, even if we
assume
(counter-factually)
that
expansion
generates
inconsistency, we have proved only that adequate capacity on
the one hand and legal consistency on the other are competing
values that must be balanced against each other, not that
judgeships should be frozen at current levels.
In order to strike the proper balance, we would need to
know much more than we do about the relationship between
additional judgeships and legal inconsistency. In the absence of
data on the purported correlation, the issue turns on the burden
of proof. That burden belongs on the opponents of expansion
because of the difference between known versus unknown costs
and benefits. The known benefit is the traditional appellate
process which made the federal appellate courts great, and
which could still survive if judgeships were increased by
adequate levels. It makes no sense to sacrifice that known
benefit in return for a completely speculative dividend of
increased consistency.
3.

Mechanisms that Enhance Consistency

Even if we assume counter-factually that increased capacity
leads inevitably to inconsistency and that consistency is the
system's paramount goal, it still does not follow that Congress
should refuse to supply additional judgeships. There are
numerous devices to safeguard consistency without permanently
limiting the nation's appellate capacity. Among them are:
(a) Better legislation: Congress should give attention, both
before and after passage, to statutory issues that recurrently
generate litigation (e.g., preemption, retroactivity, limitations).
(b) Subject-matter-specialized appellate courts or panels:
These can reduce inconsistency by decreasing the number of
decision-makers in a particular area of law.
(c) A fourth tier of courts: Another tier of courts, between
the circuit courts and the Supreme Court, could resolve intercircuit inconsistencies, thus permitting more circuits and
allowing each one to remain small enough to minimize intracircuit inconsistency.
In order to use specialization or a four-tier pyramid, the
courts would need to abandon several cherished traditions such
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as the small size and elite status of the federal judiciary, the
historical role of federal judges as generalists, the practice of
allowing conflicts to "percolate" before they reach the Supreme
Court, and the traditional conventions of circuit alignment.
As comforting and familiar as these traditions are, however,
they are also peripheral. The defining characteristics of the
federal appellate courts have been that the judges did their own
high quality work and the courts did not ration justice according
to the status of the litigants. Those defining characteristics, of
course, are in serious jeopardy. If the cost of saving them is the
abandonment of some peripheral traditions, the price may be
high, but it is certainly a worthwhile exchange.
Further, the loss of the peripheral traditions is inevitable
anyway. As caseloads continue to rise, the system will seek to
accommodate by increasing the use of screening and triage; but
at some point Congress, the bench, the bar, and the public will
cease to tolerate a regime that screens sixty or seventy-five or
ninety percent of the cases out of the traditional appellate
process. The pressure to expand will be irresistible, and loss of
the peripheral traditions will occur anyway.
D. Loss of Collegiality
Adding judges, it is sometimes argued, would reduce
collegiality between judges, thereby impairing judicial quality.
Little detail accompanies this objection, and for good reason.
First, it is by no means clear that collegiality is a function of
small size, as famous feuds on the Supreme Court attest.
Second, collegiality on the modem circuit court is probably a
myth anyway. For example, one study of the Eighth Circuit, a
relatively small court, found that even among judges on a
particular panel, "the memorandum was the most frequently
used means of communication." ' Communication with offpanel judges was "not extensive," and communication
involving track-two cases was nearly non-existent. 2
Even if collegiality were not a myth, it is difficult to see
why it should be valued so highly. No data exist to suggest that
11. Stephen L. Wasby, Internal Communication in the Eighth CircuitCourt of Appeals,
58 WASH. U. L.Q. 583, 589 (1980).
12. Id.
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collegiality produces meaningful gains in efficiency, for
instance. Of course collegiality does provide one clear benefit:
Professional life on a collegial court is more pleasant for the
judges. The courts, however, exist for the good of the nation, not
the professional satisfaction of the judges.
E. JurisdictionalRetrenchment
Advocates of a small, elite federal judiciary have their own
solution to the problem of appellate overload: jurisdictional
contraction. Congress should just return federal jurisdiction to
the proper, limited scope prescribed by the Constitution, history,
and federalism, and then the caseload of the federal courts
would decrease enormously, eliminating the need for expansion
of the judiciary.
The jurisdictional retrenchment argument, however, like
the rest of the court-capping rhetoric, is seriously flawed. The
argument relies mainly on tradition, but the historical record is
anything but clear. The reach of federal jurisdiction has changed
repeatedly in response to evolving congressional appraisals of
the need for federal solutions to social, political, and economic
problems. In the end, the scope of federal jurisdiction has hinged
less on theory and tradition and more on politics and
expedience.
A more serious problem with the argument, however, is the
bleak prospect of implementation. Even the most conservative
reform proposals like those of the Federal Courts Study
Committee have a knack for prompting spirited opposition, and
as a result, few have even been introduced in Congress, let alone
adopted.
The jurisdictional retrenchment argument is not only bad
politics, it is bad policy as well. Its fundamental error is to
misconceive the function of federal jurisdiction. That
jurisdiction exists for the good of the country-not for the good
of the federal courts. If Congress believes that "federalizing"
some area of the law will benefit the country by controlling the
drug problem or by protecting battered women, it is not merely
Congress's right, but its duty to pass such legislation, even
though it might disappoint the federal judges or require
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additional judgeships. Again, the size of the task should control
the size of the tool, not vice versa.
F. Elitism
If judicial opposition to expansion cannot rest credibly
upon the arguments usually advanced, are there other
considerations that may help to explain it? One motive is
familiarity. The current generation of judges has worked with
the bureaucratic model of justice for their entire judicial careers,
and there is a natural tendency to view as appropriate that which
is familiar. Practice on the new certiorari courts also permits the
judges to replicate their roles in practice, where they functioned
more as team leaders than as isolated artisans. The role of the
modem appellate judge, supervising elbow clerks, central staff,
and legal extems, comfortably echoes the role of the senior
practitioner, supervising the work of junior partners, associates,
and paralegals.
Another motive is probably quality of life. Judge Gerald B.
Tjoflat writes that "life as a judge on a jumbo court is
comparable to life as a citizen in a big city-life on a smaller
court to life in a small town." 1"Thus, "judges in small circuits
are able to interact with their colleagues in a more expedient and
efficient manner than judges on jumbo courts." 14 Although this
image is attractive, reality is somewhat different, as the earlier
discussion of collegiality shows. Further, it suggests that judges
associate a "small town" existence with comfort, and that sitting
on a larger court would be less homey. But the comfort of the
judges is easily overvalued; again, the courts exist for the good
of the nation, not for the satisfaction of the judges.
Yet another reason for judicial reluctance to expansion is
concern about status. Justice Scalia does not want a larger
judiciary: "It only dilutes the prestige of the office and
aggravates the problem of image." '"Once again, however, the
courts exist to serve the national need for appellate capacity, not
the judges' need for "prestige" or "image."
13. Gerald Bard Tjoflat, More Judges, Less Justice, A.B.A. J., July 1993, at 70, 70.
14. Id.
15. Stuart Taylor, Scalia Proposes Major Overhaul of the U.S. Courts, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 16, 1987, at A1, A12.
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IV. CONCLUSION

Congress established the United States Courts of Appeals
to correct error at the district court level, and for the first eighty
years of their existence, the circuit courts performed that
function according to the traditional appellate model-visibly,
collegially, personally, accountably, and equitably.
Beginning around 1970, the courts began to truncate the
traditional model to keep pace with an overwhelming increase in
the volume of cases. Today, the "routine" appeals of the
system's least wealthy and powerful litigants get no argument,
no conference, no written, published precedential opinion, and
little personal attention of Article III judges. Instead, they
receive bureaucratic treatment at the hands of the central staff.
The obvious solution to the problem is to create enough
judgeships to treat all cases in the traditional mode, but the
Judicial Establishment has opposed that solution vigorously,
relying on an array of exceedingly weak arguments. First, there
is no empirical support for the fear that expansion will reduce
the quality of the bench. Second, the cost of new judgeships is
not overwhelming compared to other federal expenditures.
Third, according to the only available empirical studies,
expansion will not create legal instability; and even if it did,
adequate capacity is at least as important as consistency. And
fourth, the jurisdictional retrenchment argument is fantasy.
Congress is not about to make radical cuts in federal jurisdiction
to accommodate the judiciary's desire to remain small.
The superficiality of these anti-expansion arguments
suggests, and some judges candidly admit, that the desire to
maintain collegiality and prestige is a major reason for judicial
opposition to expansion. There is nothing intrinsically wrong
with those goals, but short-changing the litigants for the benefit
of the judges is wrong. The courts exist for the good of the
nation, not the judges.

